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Corporate reputation under the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
David J Acheson* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines whether corporations could claim a right to reputation under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The existence of such a right could have 
significant implications for English defamation law as it relates to corporate claimants. 
The analysis in this paper focuses on Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1, because the 
European Court of Human Rights has left open the applicability of each of these Articles 
to the corporate interest in reputation:KLOHWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZLQboth of these areas 
is unclear, the argument advanced here is that there is no good justification for extending 
a right to reputation to corporations under either Article. However, given the often-
haphazard approach the Court takes to developing its interpretation of Convention rights, 
there is a risk that it will uncritically extend a Convention right to reputation to companies 
in the future. 
Keywords: European Convention on Human Rights; Article 8; Article 1, Protocol 1; 
Defamation; Reputation; Companies; Corporations.  
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 2 
Introduction 
During the debates leading to the Defamation Act 2013, the fact that corporations were 
entitled to sue for libel or slander to protect their reputations was a controversial issue, 
and µSUHYHQWLQJFRUSRUDWHVIURPVXLQJ[was] DSULPDU\JRDORIVRPHOLEHOUHIRUPHUV¶1  In 
2005, the Australian uniform defamation reforms had removed the right to sue from 
companies with ten or more employees;2 there was significant support for the idea that 
English law should follow the Australian lead, and that some or all corporations should 
be barred from suing in defamation.3 But the options available to Parliament for reform 
were limited, compared to those available to Australian legislators, by the standards to 
which the UK must adhere as a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights 
µWKH &RQYHQWLRQ¶ µWKH (&+5¶ Some limited attention was paid to the Convention-
compliance of corporate defamation reform prior to 2013: the Joint Committee on the 
Draft Defamation Bill heard evidence that removing the right to sue from companies 
might be incompatible with the Convention.4 Parliament decided against this option, 
instead requiring for-profit corporate claimants to show that statements have caused or 
are likely to cause µVHULRXV KDUP¶ WR UHSXWDWLRQ, and µVHULRXV ILQDQFLDO ORVV¶, before 
defendants can be held liable for publishing them.5 
Since then, the European Court of Human Rights µWKH&RXUW¶µWKH(&W+5¶has left open 
the possibility that corporations could claim a Convention right to reputation, under either 
                                                          
1
 $ODVWDLU0XOOLVDQG$QGUHZ6FRWW µ7KH6ZLQJRI WKH3HQGXOXP5HSXWDWLRQ([SUHVVLRQDQG Whe Re-
Centring of English LLEHO/DZ¶1ILQ 27, 54. 
2
 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW, Qld, Vic, WA, SA, Tas) s 9; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 9; Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 121. 
3
 Ministry of Justice, Draft Defamation Bill: Summary of Responses to Consultation (CP(R) 3/11, 2011) 
para 15. 
4
 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Oral and Associated Written Evidence Volume II (2010-
12, HL 203, HC 930-II) 18-19 (Lord Lester), 381-86 (Lord McNally). 
5
 Defamation Act 2013, s 1. 
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the Article 8 right to private life, or the Article 1, Protocol 1 µA1P1¶ULJKWWRSURSHUW\.6 
The main aim of this article is to consider whether companies have a Convention right to 
reputation on the basis of the current ECtHR jurisprudence, or whether the Court would 
have convincing reasons for extending such a right to companies in the future. My 
discussion of English law focuses on the defamation torts, because those torts are the 
proper vehicles for the direct protection of a claimant¶s reputation.7  
Given the lack RI FODULW\ LQ WKH &RXUW¶V jurisprudence, I also give some thoughts on 
whether companies ought to have a Convention right to reputation. My answers to all of 
these questions are the same: corporations do not presently have a right to reputation 
under Art 8 or A1P1QRUDUHWKHUHFRQYLQFLQJUHDVRQVLQWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHIRU
extending that right to companies; nor are there convincing arguments that doing so would 
be theoretically coherent or otherwise desirable. Nevertheless, the article ends with a note 
of caution, acknowledging the possibility that the Court will at some point find a 
Convention right to corporate reputation to exist, despite the absence of any good 
justification for doing so. 
Corporate human rights 
An initial objection might be raised to protecting corporations under a treaty on human 
rights. In practice, though, thH(&W+5µKDVnever doubted¶ FRPSDQLHV¶ capacity to be 
beneficiaries of Convention rights,8 and there is no reason in principle to object to the 
existence of corporate rights in the Convention. CRUSRUDWLRQVDUHE\GHILQLWLRQ µULJKWV
                                                          
6
 See text to notes 14-22. 
7
 Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc [1995] 2 AC 296 (HL) 323 (Lord Goff), citing with approval Foaminal 
Laboratories Ltd v British Artid Plastics Ltd >@$OO(5+DOOHWW-µa claim for mere loss of 
reputation is the proper subject of an action for defamation, and cannot ordinarily be sustained by means of 
any other form of action¶ 
8
 Marius Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (OUP 
2006) 4. 
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EHDULQJOHJDOHQWLWLHV¶;9 without enforceable rights they would be unable to pursue their 
objects. The existence of corporate rights under a supranational treaty such as the ECHR 
has the benefits of promoting some uniformity across jurisdictions, and of protecting 
those rights against the arbitrary use of state power.10 It might also be pointed out that 
some of the CRXUW¶VPRVWLPSRUWant jurisprudence on freedom of expression has resulted 
from claims brought by for-profit media companies.11 But the rights of companies need 
not be precisely the same as those available to human beings,12 so the protection of 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ reputations under the Convention13 does not necessarily entail that 
companies will be entitled to the same protection. 
Legal uncertainty 
The most important ECtHR decision for the purposes of this paper is Firma EDV Für Sie, 
EfS Elektronische Datenverarbeitung Dienstleistungs GmbH v Germany µEDV¶.14 The 
applicant, a µOHJDOSHUVRQIRXQGHGH[FOXVLYHO\IRUEXVLQHVVSXUSRVHV¶,15 argued that its 
rights under Art 8 and A1P1 had been violated by WKH*HUPDQFRXUWV¶IDLOXUHWRSURWHFWLW
against statemeQWVPDGHE\DQRWKHUSULYDWHSDUW\WKDWKDGµWDUQLVKHG>LWV@UHSXWDWLRQDQG
ruined its economic foundation.¶16 
The Court decided WRµOHDYHRSHQWKHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUWKHUHSXWDWLRQRIDFRPSDQ\IDOOV
XQGHUWKHQRWLRQRISULYDWHOLIHXQGHU$UWLFOH¶DQGWRSURFHHGµRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW
                                                          
9
 -RKQ 'RXJODV %LVKRS µ7KH /LPLWV RI &RUSRUDWH 5LJKWV 2EOLJDWLRQV DQG WKH 5LJKWV RI )RU-Profit 
&RUSRUDWLRQV¶%XVLQHVV(WKLFV4XDUWHUO\ 
10
 The facts of the Yukos case demonstrate the potential importance of this protection: OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos v Russia [2014] ECHR 906. 
11
 Among many possible examples: Sunday Times v UK (No 2) [1991] ECHR 50; Autronic AG v Switzerland 
[1990] ECHR 12; Bladet Tromsø v Norway [1999] ECHR 29. 
12
 eg -RKQ$UPRXUµ&RPSDQLHVDQG2WKHU$VVRFLDWLRQV¶LQ$QGUHZ%XUURZVHGEnglish Private Law (3rd 
edn, OUP 2013) paras 3.17-3.18. 
13
 See text to notes 70-88. 
14
 App no 32783/08 (ECtHR, 2 September 2014) µEDV¶ 
15
 Ibid, para 31. 
16
 Ibid, para 18. 
 5 
$UWLFOH  DSSOLHV¶17 The application was declared inadmissible because the Court 
considered that the domestic courts had balanced the competing interests under Arts 8 
and 10 reasonably, acting within their margin of appreciation.18  
7KH &RXUW DOVR OHIW RSHQ WKH TXHVWLRQ µZKHWKHU D FRPSDQ\¶V UHSXWDWLRQ DQG JRRGZLOO
FRQVWLWXWH³SRVVHVVLRQV´¶XQGHU$3, thereby attracting the protection of that Article, on 
the grounds that the DSSOLFDQW¶V complaint under A1P1 raised no separate issues from its 
complaint under Art 8.19 
More recently, the Court has assumed that Art 8 protects corporate reputation in two 
decisions on the Art 10 right to freedom of expression. In the first, Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete v Hungary, the applicants complained that their Art 10 
rights had been violated by the imposition of liability for their publication of defamatory 
statements about a company.20 The Court VWDWHGDJDLQWKDWµit is not necessary to decide 
whether the plaintiff company could justifiably rely on its right to reputation, seen from 
the perspective of Article 8¶, and proceeded on the assumption that it could.21  
In the second of these cases, Ärztekammer für Wien v Austria, the Court did not even 
acknowledge that Art 8 might not protect the reputation of a corporation. It simply noted 
WKDW WKH DSSOLFDQW KDG µPDGH D SXEOLF VWDWHPHQW Zhich affected the reputation of [a] 
company¶, and that the right to reputation µis a right which is protected by Article 8¶, 
before assessing whether the Austrian courts had appropriately balanced the competing 
interests under Arts 8 and 10.22 
                                                          
17
 Ibid, para 23. 
18
 Ibid, para 29. 
19
 Ibid, para 34. 
20
 Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete v Hungary >@(&+5µMTE¶ 
21
 Ibid, para 67.  
22
 Ärztekammer für Wien v Austria [2016] ECHR 179, para 62. 
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English courts 
English courts have not interpreted Art 8 as protecting corporate reputation.23 In 
Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc v Aviation News Ltd, Tugendhat J stated plainly that 
µLQWKHFRQWH[WRIDGHIDPDWLRQFODLPDFRUSRUDWHFODLPDQWGRHVQRWKDYHUHOHYDQWULJKWV
under ECH5 $UW ¶24 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott consider this point to be 
µXQFRQWURYHUVLDO¶ VWDWLQJ WKDW it is µa commonplace that corporations do not possess 
$UWLFOHULJKWVRIWKLVW\SH¶25 It is typical for corporate defamation claimants to accept 
that Art 8 does not protect their reputations.26  
The position under A1P1 is less clear. Tugendhat J suggested in Thornton v Telegraph 
Media Group Ltd that GHIDPDWRU\ LPSXWDWLRQV UHODWLQJ WR FODLPDQWV¶ µSURIHVVLRQDO
DWWULEXWHV¶ would, compared to those relating to personal characteristics, EHµOHVVOLNHO\WR
engage their rights under Art 8, but may engage only their commercial or property rights 
(which are Convention rights, if at all, under [A1P1]¶27 In his analysis, defamation 
claims brought by companies will DOZD\V IDOO LQWR WKH FDWHJRU\ RI µEXVLQHVV
GHIDPDWLRQ¶28 so may engage A1P1, but not Art 8. A similar observation ± that A1P1 
µmight DSSO\¶± was made in Building Register Ltd v Weston with respect to a corporate 
claimant.29 However, in the context of a malicious falsehood claim, the existence of an 
$3ULJKWWRUHSXWDWLRQKDVEHHQFRQVLGHUHGµGRXEWIXO¶E\WKH&RXUWRI$SSHDO30 
                                                          
23
 Richard Parkes and others, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) para 2.3. 
24
 [2013] EWHC 1505 (QB) [20]. See also Hays plc v Hartley [2010] EWHC (QB) 1068 [25]; Ronaldo v 
Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 2710 (QB) [58]. 
25
 Mullis and Scott (n 1) 46. 
26
 Hays (n 24) [25]; Building Register Ltd v Weston [2014] EWHC 784 (QB) [19]; Global Torch Ltd v Apex 
Global Management Ltd [2013] EWHC 223 (Ch) [73]->@&IWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVXEPLVVLRQQRWFRPPHQWHG
upon by Eady J, in Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corp [2009] EWHC 1765 
(QB) [46]. 
27
 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB) [38]. 
28
 Ibid, [34]. 
29
 Building Register Ltd (n 26) [19] (Dingemans J) (emphasis added). 
30
 Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS v Asda Stores Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 609 [29] (Sedley LJ). 
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If the ECtHR were to decide that corporate reputation does fall within the scope of either 
right, though, the approach of the English courts would be likely to change to reflect that 
decision. While s 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 only requires MXGJHV WR µWDNH LQWR
DFFRXQW¶UDWKHUWKDQWRIROOow, relevant Strasbourg decisions, in practice English courts 
are likely to follow the (&W+5¶VLnterpretation of the Convention.31  
Given the (&W+5¶V decision in EDV, this article focuses on the possible existence of a 
right to corporate reputation under Art 8 or A1P1.32 But first I discuss the relevance of 
corporate reputation to Article 3DUDJUDSKµ$UW¶ of the Convention. 
Article 10(2) 
Art 10(2) sets out the permissible justifications a member state can offer for restricting 
the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Art 10(1)2QHVXFKMXVWLILFDWLRQLVµIRU
the protection of the reputation « of otheUV¶ This is the only explicit reference to 
reputation in the Convention. As such, the ECtHR has historically treated reputation as 
relevant to the Convention only in the context of Art 10(2).33  
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WRWKHFRXUWVIRUWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIDSSOLFDQWV¶µFLYLOULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQV¶Golder v United Kingdom 
App no 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975) para 36) and that failing to allow companies the right to sue 
in defamation would constitute discrimination in the protection of that right of access, contrary to Art 14. 
However, Art 6 only guarantees a right of access WRWKHFRXUWVLQUHVSHFWRIH[LVWLQJGRPHVWLFµFLYLOULJKWV¶
it does not guarantee the existence of any particular substantive right in domestic law: Roche v United 
Kingdom App no 32555/96 (ECtHR, 19 October 2005) paras 117-119; Matthews v Ministry of Defence 
[2003] 1 AC 1163 (HL) [3]. The Court has previously suggested that whether Art 6 is engaged by a 
UHVWULFWLRQ RQ WKH ULJKW WR VXH LQ GHIDPDWLRQ GHSHQGV RQ ZKHWKHU WKDW UHVWULFWLRQ LV µVXEVWDQWLYH¶ or 
µprocedural¶,IDUHVWULFWLRQLVVXEVWDQWLYH (ie µGHOLPLW>LQJ@WKHYHU\FRQWHQWRIWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKWWRD
JRRGUHSXWDWLRQ¶ then it does not engage Art 6: Fayed v UK App no 17101/90 (ECtHR, 21 September 
1990) paras 66-67. It follows that the complete removal of the corporate right to sue in defamation would 
not engage Art 6. If Art 6 is not engaged, then Art 14 is irrelevant because it only has effect in circumstances 
where another Convention right is engaged: EB v France App no 43546/02 (ECtHR, 22 January 2008) para 
47. As such, this aspect of Lord LHVWHU¶VDUJXPHQWZLOOQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGDQ\IXUWKHUKHUH 
33
 eg Lingens v Austria [1986] ECHR 7; 6WLMQ6PHWµ)UHHGRPRI([SUHVVLRQDQGWKH5LJKWWR5HSXWDWLRQ
Human Rights in Conflict (2010) 26(1) Am U Int¶O L Rev 183, 192. 
 8 
The Court has unambiguously held that the protection of corporate as well as individual 
reputation can be a legitimate reason to restrict freedom of expression under Art 10(2). 
The clearest of these statements was made in Steel v UK,34 the culmination of the 
µMcLibel¶ litigation LQYROYLQJDGHIDPDWLRQVXLWEURXJKWE\WKH0F'RQDOG¶VFRUSRUDWLRQ
against two environmental activists.35 The Court IRXQG WKDW µWKH (QJOLVK ODZ RI
GHIDPDWLRQDQGLWVDSSOLFDWLRQLQWKLVSDUWLFXODUFDVHSXUVXHGWKHOHJLWLPDWHDLPRI³WKH
protection of the UHSXWDWLRQRUULJKWVRIRWKHUV´¶,36 although in that case the effect on the 
DSSOLFDQWV¶$UWULJKWVKDGEHHQGLVSUoportionate. 
So corporate reputation is relevant to the Convention in at least one respect: member 
states are permitted under Art 10(2) to restrict freedom of expression in order to protect 
the reputation of a company. But permitting restrictions on the Convention rights of others 
to protect a particular interest is not the same as guaranteeing that interest substantive 
Convention protection in its own right.37 Whether corporate reputation could attract such 
protection therefore remains important. 
Importance 
Whether corporate reputation is protected by a Convention right, rather than being merely 
a permissible justification for restricting expression, is important for three main reasons. 
Firstly, the answer to that question will affect the protection of corporate reputation in 
domestic defamation law. Secondly, if companies have a Convention right to reputation, 
states would be subject to obligations to protect that right. Thirdly, the existence of a 
                                                          
34
 [2005] ECHR 103. 
35
 0F'RQDOG¶V Corp v Steel (No 1) [1995] 3 All ER 615. SHH$QWKRQ\+XGVRQµ)UHH6SHHFKDQG(TXDOLW\
of Arms ± The Decision in Steel & Morris v United Kingdom¶(+5/5 
36
 Steel (n 34) para 86. See also Uj v Hungary App no 23954/10 (ECtHR, 19 July 2011) para 22; .XOLĞDQG
5yĪ\FNL Y 3RODQG App no 27209/03 (ECtHR, 6 October 2009) para 35; Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v 
Germany (1990) 12 EHRR 161, paras 34-35. 
37
 See text to notes 105-112. 
 9 
Convention right to corporate reputation would entail that companies could apply to the 
ECtHR alleging a violation of that right by a member state. 
Effect on domestic protection 
The level of protection given to a corporate claimant¶V reputation in a domestic 
defamation case would be higher if that interest falls within the scope of a Convention 
right than if it does not. 
If no Convention right protects corporate reputation, then the reputational interests in a 
FRPSDQ\¶VGHIDPDWLRQFODLP will be relevant only as a justification for restricting the 
GHIHQGDQW¶V expression under Art 10(2). To comply with the terms of Art 10(2) a 
restriction on expression must EHµQHFHVVDU\LQDGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\¶ which entails that 
it addresses D µSUHVVLQJ VRFLDO QHHG¶ DQG LV µSURSRUWLRQDWH WR WKH OHJLWLPDWH DLP
SXUVXHG¶38 The QHFHVVLW\ RI D UHVWULFWLRQ RQ H[SUHVVLRQ µPust be convincingly 
established¶ by the state if it is challenged in Strasbourg.39 Where defamatory statements 
relate to matters of public interest, as they often will do in corporate defamation claims,40 
the ECtHR ZLOO VXEMHFW UHVWULFWLRQVRQH[SUHVVLRQ WR WKH µPRVW FDUHIXO VFUXWLQ\¶41 the 
Court has declared that Art 10(2) provides µOLWWOHVFRSH« for restrictions on debate on 
TXHVWLRQVRISXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶42 Further, if the protection of reputation is treated solely as 
a justification for restricting the GHIHQGDQW¶V Art 10 rights, then the human rights analysis 
will start from the presumption that those rights have priority.43  
                                                          
38




 See eg Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [158]; Jan Oster, Media Freedom as 
a Fundamental Right (Cambridge University Press 2015) 157. 
41
 Bladet Tromsø (n 11) para 64. 
42
 Heinisch v Germany [2011] ECHR 1175, para 66. 
43
 -DQ2VWHUµ7KH&ULWLFLVPRI7UDGLQJ&RUSRUDWLRQVDQGWKHLU5LJKWWR6XHIRU'HIDPDWLRQ¶-(7/
255, 263; Mullis and Scott (n 1) 34. 
 10 
In contrast, if the reputational interests in a corporate defamation claim fall within the 
scope of Art 8, then the claim would need to be resolved using the very different approach 
described by Lord Steyn in Re S (a child).44 The court must engage in a balancing 
exercise, assessing the relative importance of the SDUWLHV¶ULJKWV in the circumstances of 
the case, from an initial position of presumptive parity between those rights.45 
The enhanced protection offered to reputation as part of the Art 8 right to private life was 
acknowledged (and endorsed) in Judge Loucaides¶ concurring opinion in Lindon v 
France, one of the earliest cases asserting the link between Art 8 and individual 
reputation:  
Accepting that respect for reputation is an autonomous human right, which derives 
its source from the Convention itself, leads inevitably to a more effective 
protection of the reputation of individuals vis-à-vis freedom of expression.46  
If a Convention right to corporate reputation exists, then it too would be entitled to this 
µPRUHHIIHFWLYHSURWHFWLRQ¶IURPWKH Strasbourg court, and in English defamation law ± 
and, as such, the law would provide less effective protection to critical speech about 
corporations and their activities.47 
                                                          
44
 [2004] UKHL 47. 
45
 Ibid, [17]. 
46
 Lindon v France [2007] ECHR 836, p 40.  
47
 This consequence will also result to some extent from the protection of individual reputation under the 
Convention, insofar as individuals who are closely connected to particular companies, for example 
managers or directors, benefit from that protection in respect of injuries to their personal reputations caused 
by allegations against the companies with which they are associated. IW VHHPV WKDW DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
professional reputation can in principle be protected under Art 8 (eg Oleksandr Volkov v Ukraine [2013] 
ECHR 288, paras 165-167). The effect of lawsuits brought in these circumstances on the right to criticise 
corporate activities is a subject of legitimate concern (eg Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Press 
Standards, Privacy and Libel (HC 2009-10, 362-I) para 175). However, this point will not be addressed 
further here, because the relevance of Art 8 WRLQGLYLGXDOV¶SURIHVVLRQDOUHSXWDWLRQV, and the effect of the 
subject matter of this kind of speech on the balance between Arts 8 and 10, are distinct issues from the 
&RQYHQWLRQ¶VDSSOLFDELOLW\WR corporate reputation. For discussion of this subject, see eg David Howarth, 
µ/LEHO,WV3XUSRVHDQG5HIRUP¶0LR 845, 872-73. 
 11 
There is less case law on the appropriate approach to conflicts between rights under        
Art 10 and A1P1. However, in common with Art 8, the permissibility of an interference 
with A1P1 depends in part on its proportionality,48 and the ECtHR has spoken of 
µEDODQFLQJ WKH ULJKWV LQ LVVXH¶ ZKHQ WKH ULJKW WR SURSHUW\ comes into conflict with              
Art 10.49 It may be that protection for property rights is less extensive than for other 
fundamental rights,50 and restrictions on A3ULJKWVµattract a particularly wide margin 
RIDSSUHFLDWLRQ¶51 But corporate reputation would likely be entitled to greater protection 
if it falls within the scope of A1P1 than if it is not protected by any Convention right. 
There are, admittedly, also some reasons to think that a Convention right to corporate 
reputation might not, in practice, have a huge impact on how that interest is protected in 
domestic defamation cases. 
Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson note that whether Art 8 is engaged by an interest is 
a separate issue from how much weight it should be accorded, either when it is balanced 
against a competing Convention right, or when assessing whether an interference with it 
is permissible under Art 8(2).52 The ECtHR has accepted that the applicability of a 
Convention right to companies does not necessarily guarantee them the same level of 
protection as would be offered to individuals.53 For example, in its decision to extend the 
Art 8 protection of the µKRPH¶WRFRUSRUDWH premises, it held WKDWDVWDWH¶VµHQWLWOHPHQWWR
                                                          
48
 Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium [1995] ECHR 471, para 38. 
49
 Appleby v UK [2003] ECHR 222, para 49. 
50
 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 254. See also Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd 
[2002] Ch 149 (CA) 161, where the conflict between speech and property (in copyright) seems to be treated 
under Art 10(2). 
51
 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP 2006) 147. See 
also R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52, [129]. 
52
 Fenwick and Phillipson (n 51) 1100. 
53
 Emberland (n 8) 139. 
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interfere [under Art 8(2)] may be more far-reaching where the business premises of a 
MXULVWLFSHUVRQDUHFRQFHUQHG¶54  
In Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management Ltd,55 in the context of the open justice 
principle, the Court of Appeal held that it was not necessarily inconsistent with the Re S 
approach for one of the competing rights to be more likely to prevail than the other. 
0DXULFH.D\/-H[SODLQHGWKDWµWKHFRPSHWLQJULJKWVGRQRWH[LVWZLWKLQDSUHVXPSWLYH
legal hierarchy but that does not mean that in given situations ± for example, open justice 
versus reputational damage ± one will not generally WUXPSWKHRWKHU¶56 Even if corporate 
reputation is protected under a substantive Convention right, in individual cases the 
likelihood that the statements complained of would be on a matter of public interest and 
WKHµYHU\GLIIHUHQWFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRILQGLYLGXDOVDQGFRPSDQLHV¶ would be relevant to the 
balance between Arts 8 and 10.57 It is possible, then, that granting companies a 
Convention right to reputation would in practice have only a minimal impact on the 
outcomes of corporate defamation claims. 
However, the existence of such a right would clearly have implications for the substantive 
law applicable to defamation claims brought by companies,58 and there is no guarantee 
that the consequent effect on the outcomes of such claims would in fact be minimal. 
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 Société Colas Est v France >@(&+5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Torch approach may not be applicable in corporate defamation cases. 
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qc/>. See MTE (n 20) para 84; Ärztekammer (n 22) para 65. 
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Changes to the substantive law that are favourable to corporate claimants might also have 
LPSRUWDQWFRQVHTXHQFHVRXWVLGHWKHFRXUWVWKDWLVWKH\ULVNDJJUDYDWLQJWKHODZ¶VFKLOOLQJ
effect on speech about corporations. 
Convention obligations 
Another important consequence of the existence of a Convention right to corporate 
reputation would be the imposition on member states of obligations with respect to its 
protection.  
If corporate reputation is not a Convention right in itself, it cannot give rise to any 
Convention duties. As such, its protection in domestic law would be permissible but not 
required.59 7KLVFDQEHVHHQLQWKH(&W+5¶VMXGJPHQWLQSteel. Holding that a member 
VWDWHµHQMR\VDPDUJLQRIDSSUHFLDWLRQDVWRWKHPHDQVLWSURYLGHVXQGHUGRPHVWLFODZWR
enable a company to challenge the truth, and limit the damage, of allegations which risk 
KDUPLQJLWVUHSXWDWLRQ¶60 the Court said: µIf«D6WDWHGHFLGHVWRSURYLGHVXFKDUHPHG\
WR D FRUSRUDWHERG\¶, theQGHIHQGDQWV¶ Art 10 rights UHTXLUH µD measure of procedural 
fairness¶ in the operation of that remedy.61 Based on WKHZRUGµLI¶ in this passage, Lord 
McNally suggested to the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill that the Court 
could be interpreted as having ruled that the VWDWH¶Vmargin of appreciation µextends as far 
DVGHFLGLQJWRRIIHUQRUHPHG\¶62 This interpretation must be correct. Article 1 of the 
Convention imposes DQREOLJDWLRQRQPHPEHUVWDWHVWRµVHFXUHWRHYHU\RQHZLWKLQWKHLU
MXULVGLFWLRQWKHULJKWVDQGIUHHGRPVGHILQHGLQ«WKLV&RQYHQWLRQ¶WKHUHLVQRREOLJDWLRQ
on states to protect interests that do not fall within the scope of a Convention right. 
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If, however, corporate reputation does fall within the scope of a Convention right, then it 
will give rise to obligations under Art 1. These may include positive obligations, requiring 
states to ensure protection for the right in the relationships between private individuals 
(ie in private law contexts such as defamation claims).63 µNHJDWLYH¶REOLJDWLRQV require 
states WRUHIUDLQIURPWDNLQJDFWLRQVWKDWYLRODWH&RQYHQWLRQULJKWVµSRVLWLYH¶REOLgations 
are those that require them to take actions to ensure the enjoyment of Convention rights.64 
If the UK is under a positive obligation to protect corporate reputation, an Australian-
style removal of the corporate right to sue in defamation may be incompatible with the 
Convention.65  
Right to apply to the European Court of Human Rights 
Finally, the existence of a Convention right to corporate reputation would allow 
companies to apply to the ECtHR alleging a violation of that right.66 Corporations, 
including for-profit compaQLHV DUH FRQVLGHUHG WR EH µQRQJRYHUQPHQWDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶
under Art 34 of the Convention, and therefore have standing to apply to the Court 
claiming to be victim to a rights violation.67 The discovery of a right to individual 
reputation under Art 8 of the Convention µpermit[ted] disgruntled libel claimants to apply 
to the Strasbourg court to contest the perceived failure of domestic laws to ensure respect 
IRUWKHULJKWWRUHSXWDWLRQ¶68 The same would be true of a Convention right to corporate 
reputation.  
                                                          
63
 Von Hannover v Germany (No 1) [2004] ECHR 294; Oster (n 43) 264. 
64
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(+5/R 277, 282. 
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 Emberland (n 8) 4. 
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Summary 
Whether companies can claim a Convention right to reputation has important implications 
for the ongoing application, and any future reform, of English defamation law. It may be 
WKDWWKHYLHZWKDWUHPRYLQJWKHULJKWWRVXHIURPFRPSDQLHVµZRXOGEHDt risk of being 
incompatible¶ with the Convention69 prevented that option from being taken in the 2013 
Act, or at least prevented it from being seriously considered. As such, it is important to 
clarify the possible existence of a Convention right to corporate reputation. The following 
sections attempt to do so, addressing first Art 8 and then A1P1.  
Article 8 
Individual reputation under Article 8 
Art 8(1) of the Convention does not explicitly include a right to reputation: 




omitted from Article 8¶.70 Notwithstanding the drafting history, however, the ECtHR has 
decided that the right to reputation falls within the scope of Art 8.  
The Court first asserted that Art 8 protects reputation in Radio France v France, in 2004, 
stating that: µWKH ULJKW WR SURWHFWLRQ RI RQH¶s reputation is of course one of the rights 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, as one element of the right to respect for 
                                                          
69
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70
 -9HOXµ7KH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWVDQGWKH5LJKWWR5HVSHFWIRU3ULYDWH/LIHWKH+RPH
DQG &RPPXQLFDWLRQV¶ LQ $UWKXU +HQU\ 5HEHUWVRQ HG Privacy and Human Rights: Reports and 
Communications Presented at the Third International Colloquy about the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Manchester University Press 1973) 42. 
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SULYDWH OLIH¶71 As Gavin Millar points out, µ1R DXWKRULW\ ZDV RIIHUHG IRU WKLV
SURSRVLWLRQ¶72 QRUDQ\H[SODQDWLRQRIWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ Following Radio France the 
Court repeated its assertion, again without explanation, in a series of other Art 10 cases.73  
,Q DOO RI WKHVH FDVHV WKH ULJKW WR UHSXWDWLRQ ZDV UHIHUUHG WR DV DQ µDVSHFW¶ µSDUW¶, or 
µHOHPHQW¶RIWKHULJKWWRSULYDWHOLIH protected by Art 8, with no explanation as to why that 
was suddenly the case.74 The first attempt to explain, rather than simply assert, the 
protection of reSXWDWLRQXQGHU$UWZDVPDGHLQ-XGJH/RXFDLGHV¶ concurring opinion in 
Lindon v France.75 The majority made no reference to Art 8, instead discussing the 
reputational interests in the case only in relation to Art 10(2).76  Judge Loucaides, in 
contrast, argued that the µright to reputation should always have been considered as 
safeguarded by Article 8 of the Convention, as part and parcel of the right to respect for 
RQH¶V SULYDWH OLIH¶77 He linked the protection of reputation with the value of human 
dignity, and emphasised the importance of the latter to the fundamental aims of the 
Convention as a whole.78   
The Court first found a violation of Art 8 in respect of reputational harm in Pfeifer v 
Austria.79 The majority explained its decision E\VWDWLQJWKDW$UWSURWHFWVµDSHUVRQ¶V
SK\VLFDODQGSV\FKRORJLFDOLQWHJULW\¶DQGLVLQWHQGHGWRµHQVXUHWKHGHYHORSPHQW«RI
WKHSHUVRQDOLW\RIHDFKLQGLYLGXDOLQKLVUHODWLRQVZLWKRWKHUKXPDQEHLQJV¶80 The Court 
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reiterated the assertion it had made in Von Hannover v Germany (No 1) that the scope of 
µSULYDWHOLIH¶LQ$UWH[WHQGVWRµD]RQHRILQWHUDFWLRQRIDSHUVRQZLWKRWKHUVHYHQLQD
SXEOLFFRQWH[W¶81 After relying additionally on the Art 10 cases in which it had found that 
reputation fell within the scope of Art 8, the Court concluded WKDWµDSHUVRQ¶VUHSXWDWLRQ
«IRUPVSDUWRIKLVRUKHUSHUVRQDOLGHQWLW\DQGSV\FKRORJLFDOLQWHJULW\DQGWKHUHIRUH« 
falls within the scope of his or her ³SULYDWHOLIH´¶82 
In subsequent cases, the Court narrowed WKHVFRSHRI$UW¶VSURWHFWLRQRIUHSXWDWLRQ
Rather than viewing reputational harm as necessarily engaging Art 8, the Court began 
imposing DµVHULRXVQHVV¶WKUHVKROG to engage Art 8, an µDWWDFNRQpersonal honour and 
reputation must attain a certain level of gravity and in a manner causing prejudice to 
SHUVRQDOHQMR\PHQWRIWKHULJKWWRUHVSHFWIRUSULYDWHOLIH¶83 
The Court appeared to roll back the protection of reputation under Art 8 still further in 
Karakó v Hungary.84 It emphasised that the interests in reputation and privacy are 
µFRQFHSWXDOO\ GLVWLQFW¶, EHFDXVH µSHUVRQDO LQWHJULW\ ULJKWV IDOOLQJ ZLWKLQ WKH DPELW RI
Article 8 are unrelated to the external evaluation of the individual, whereas in matters of 
UHSXWDWLRQWKDWHYDOXDWLRQLVGHFLVLYH¶85 It suggested that defamatory imputations would 
RQO\HQJDJH$UWLIµWKHLUSXEOLFDWLRQKDGDQLQHYLWDEOHGLUHFWHIIHFWRQWKHDSSOLFDQW¶V
SULYDWHOLIH¶86 However, the Court does not seem to have followed Karakó in subsequent 
cases,87  instead reverting to a standard similar to that laid down in A v Norway; that is, 
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UHSXWDWLRQLVSURWHFWHGXQGHU$UWDVµSDUWRI¶WKHDSSOLFDQW¶VSULYDWHOLIHVXEMHFWWRWKH
attack on UHSXWDWLRQUHDFKLQJDµFHUWDLQOHYHORIVHULRXVQHVV¶88  
The Court has rarely attempted to explain its protection of reputation under Art 8, and 
there is a lack of clarity and consistency in the explanations it has offered.89 This is 
problematic, because without a clear justification for the protection of individual 
reputation under Art 8, it is more difficult to determine whether it would be doctrinally 
coherent to offer the same protection to corporate entities.  
Tanya Aplin and Jason %RVODQGLGHQWLI\µWKUHHSRVVLEOHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLS
between reputation and the right to private OLIH¶ILUVWO\WKDWreputation is in itself µSDUWRI¶
an appliFDQW¶Vprivate life; secondly, that a reputational injury may coincide with a distinct 
infringement of private life; and, thirdly, that a reputational injury may cause a distinct 
infringement of private life.90 They reject the second interpretation primarily because it 
fits with only some of the Strasbourg case law;91 and the first because it is theoretically 
LQFRKHUHQW LJQRULQJ WKH µXQGRXEWHGO\ FRUUHFW¶ GLVWLQFWLRQ drawn in Karakó between 
reputation and private life92) and would render the seriousness threshold favoured in some 
RIWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVµQRQVHQVLFDO¶93 $SOLQDQG%RVODQGDUJXHWKDWWKHWKLUGµFDXVDO¶
H[SODQDWLRQ LV µWKHPRVWGRFWULQDOO\ FRKHUHQW DQGFRQFHSWXDOO\ VRXQG¶94 If this causal 
interpretation is accepted, then there is no real protection of reputation under Art 8:95 the 
interests protected are discrete privacy interests, with the protection of reputation 
operating essentially as a presumption that a sufficiently serious attack on reputation will 
                                                          
88
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have caused a consequential privacy harm. However, Aplin and Bosland note that this 
interpretation does not explain the mechanism by which reputational harm might cause 
such an infringement of private life. 
When discussing the protection of reputation under Art 8, the Court employs several stock 
phrases to explain its link with the concept of private life. It may, for example, note that 
µSULYDWHOLIH¶XQGHU $UWH[WHQGVWRLQWHUHVWVLQµSHUVRQDOLGHQWLW\¶96 RUµSV\FKRORJLFDO
LQWHJULW\¶97 or µWKH ULJKW WR HVWDEOLVK DQG GHYHORS UHODWLRQVKLSV ZLWK RWKHU KXPDQ
EHLQJV¶98 Various theoretical justifications for these links have been proposed. Mullis 
and Scott use tKHµORRNLQJ-JODVVVHOI¶WKHRU\ found in sociological literature to argue that 
KDUPWRDSHUVRQ¶VUHSXWDWLRQPD\EHUHIOHFWHGLQKDUPWRWKHLUVHOI-worth, and therefore 
WKHLU µSV\FKRORJLFDO LQWHJULW\¶99 7KH µVRFLDOLW\¶ WKHRU\ SURSRVHG E\ 'DYLG +RZDUWK
KLJKOLJKWVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIDSHUVRQ¶VUHSXWDWLRQWRWKHir social relationships.100 In turn, 
the importance of social relationships to Art 8 has been explained by the Court in terms 
of the underlying value of personal autonomy.101 But the lack of clarity and consistency 
LQWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHPHDQVWKDWWKHVH theories only partially fit the case law, and 
the precise link (or links) between the interest in reputation and the rights protected under 
Art 8 remains unclear. 
Corporate reputation under Article 8 
Art 8 rights are normally considered to be applicable primarily to individuals, rather than 
companies. Nevertheless, the ECtHR has held that the protection of µKRPH¶ LQ $UW 
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32. 
98
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extends to companLHV¶ business premises,102 DQGWKHSURWHFWLRQRIµFRUUHVSRQGHQFH¶DOVR
applies to corporate applicants.103 As such, it is at least possible that in the future the 
Court will interpret Art 8 as protecting corporate reputation. However, as noted in Gatley 
on Libel and Slander µEULQJLQJ FRUSRUDWH UHSXWDWLRQ ZLWKLQ DUW ZRXOG DPRXQW WR D
significant, as yet not clearly justifieGH[WHQVLRQRIDUW¶VDPELW¶104 I argue in this section 
that no sufficient justification exists. 
Relevance elsewhere in the Convention 
One argument for protecting corporate reputation under Art 8 can be swiftly rejected: the 
argument that such a right must, or should, exist under Art 8 DVDFRUROODU\RIWKH&RXUW¶V
recognition that the Art 10 right to freedom of expression can permissibly be restricted to 
protect corporate reputation.105 Peter Oliver, for example, relies on the &RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQV
in Comingersoll SA v Portugal,106 Steel,107 and Uj v Hungary,108 suggesting that they 
µVWURQJO\LQGLFDWHWKDW$UWLFOH(&+5SURWHFWVWKHUHSXWDWLRQRIDOOHFRQRPLFDFWRUV¶109 
2OLYHU¶VDUJXPHQWis WKDWLQWKHVHFDVHVµWKH(&W+5KDVDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
DFRPSDQ\¶VUHSXWDWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRRWKHUDUWLFOHVRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶110 in Comingersoll 
by awarding a company non-pecuniary compensation under Art 41 for reputational 
injury,111 and in Steel and Uj by holding that, in principle, Art 10(2) permits speech to be 
restricted for the purpose of protecting corporate reputation. But acknowledging the 
                                                          
102
 Colas (n 54) para 41. 
103
 Association for European Integration and Human Rights v Bulgaria App no 62540/00 (ECtHR, 28 June 
2007) para 60 µAEIHR¶; Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v Austria [2007] ECHR 815, para 45.  
104
 Gatley (n 23) para 2.3. 
105
 eg Velu (n 70) 19. 
106
 [2000] ECHR 159. 
107
 Steel (n 34).  
108
 Uj (n 36). 
109
 3HWHU2OLYHUµ3ULYDF\DQG'DWD3URWHFWLRQ5LJKWVRI(FRQRPLF$FWRUV¶LQ6\EHGH9ULHV8OI%HUQLW]
and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument: Five Years 
Old and Growing (Hart 2015) 314. 
110
 Ibid, 313. 
111
 Comingersoll (n 106) para 35, and the concurring opinion of Judge Rozakis at pp 9-10 (placing greater 
emphasis on reputation). 
 21 
importance of corporate reputation in these contexts is not the same as declaring that it 
falls within the scope of Art 8. The permissibility of a restriction under Art 10(2) and the 
existence of a substantive right elsewhere in the Convention are separate questions. It 
may be worth noting that the Court mentioned its case law on corporate reputation under 
Art 10(2) in EDV.112 Although it is not clear whether that case law contributed to the 
&RXUW¶V assumption that Art 8 protects corporate reputation, to the extent that it did this 
reasoning is obviously incoherent. 
Positive and negative obligations 
It has been argued that there cannot be an Art 8 right to corporate reputation (relevant to 
defamation law) because, under that Article, corporate applicants can only be victims of 
D PHPEHU VWDWH¶V IDLOXUH WR IXOILO LWV negative obligations, and the protection of a 
FODLPDQW¶V$UW ULJKWV LQGRPHVWLFdefamation SURFHHGLQJV LV DQ DVSHFW RI WKHVWDWH¶V
positive obligations.113 
Insofar as this argument points out that the Court has, to date, only granted the protection 
of Art 8 to corporate applicants in cases involving breaches of D VWDWH¶V negative 
obligations, it is accurate. In this sense, the argument has some weight: it suggests that 
the extension of the Art 8 right to reputation to companies in a defamation context would 
be a more significant step for the Court to take than it might otherwise seem. The Court 
has held that Art 8 will only givHULVHWRSRVLWLYHREOLJDWLRQVLQµexceptional cases where 
WKH6WDWH¶V IDLOXUH WRDGRSWPHDVXUHV LQWHUIHUHVZLWK >WKHDSSOLFDQW¶V@ right to personal 
development and his or her right to establish and maintain relations with other human 
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EHLQJVDQGWKHRXWVLGHZRUOG¶114 This seems to be a high ± possibly insurmountable ± bar 
to the Court finding that states are under a positive obligation to protect corporate 
reputation. 
However, the Court has also KHOGWKDWWKHµERXQGDULHVEHWZHHQWKH6WDWH¶VSRVLWLYHDQG
QHJDWLYH REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU $UWLFOH  GR QRW OHQG WKHPVHOYHV WR SUHFLVH GHILQLWLRQ¶.115 
Moreover, in determining wheWKHUWKH&RQYHQWLRQLPSRVHVDSDUWLFXODUREOLJDWLRQµWKH
DSSOLFDEOHSULQFLSOHV DUH«VLPLODU¶ UHJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHU WKHSXUSRUWHG REOLJDWLRQ LV
positive or negative.116 The fact that the interest in corporate reputation is more likely to 
be infringed by a sWDWH¶VIDLOXUHWRDFWWKDQE\DVWDWH¶VSRVLWLYHDFWLRQVHHPVXQOLNHO\WR
be an absolute bar to the existence of a Convention right, even if the Court has not yet 
imposed positive obligations on states to respect any of the Art 8 rights it has extended to 
companies. In EDV, the applicant claimed that the state had breached its positive 
obligations; the Court did not seem to consider this a barrier to the applicability of Art 
8.117 
The argument also conflates two conceptually distinct issues: the scope of the interests 
protected under a particular Convention right, and the nature of the obligations imposed 
on member states with respect to those interests.118 Whether corporate reputation falls 
within the scope of Art 8 relates to the first of these issues; whether any Art 8 right to 
corporate reputation imposes positive obligations on member states is a distinct question. 
If no relevant interest under Art 8 is engaged by an injury to corporate reputation, the 
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question whether a state is under a positive obligation with respect to that injury is 
nonsensical. And if the Court found that Art 8 protects corporate reputation in a case 
LQYROYLQJDVWDWH¶VQHJDWLYHREOLJDWLRQV LWZRXOGVHHP illogical to deny the possibility 
that the interest in corporate reputation, now within the scope of Art 8, could also give 
rise to positive obligations in appropriate cases. 
Private life 
Jan Oster argues that the right to reputation under Art 8 does not extend to corporate 
applicants, partly becauseRIWKHIRXUFDWHJRULHVRILQWHUHVWSURWHFWHGE\$UWµSULYDWH
OLIH¶µIDPLO\OLIH¶µKRPH¶DQGµFRUUHVSRQGHQFH¶RQO\WKHODWWHUWZRKDYHWKXVIDUEHHQ
held to protect legal persons by the ECtHR. Reputation, in contrast, is protected under the 




However, WKH &RXUW KDV FRQVLVWHQWO\ VWDWHG WKDW µ3ULYDWH OLIH LV D EURDG WHUP QRW
susceptible to exhaustive definition¶,121 DQG WKDW LW µPXVW QRW EH LQWHUSUHWHG
restrictLYHO\¶122 While the fact that it has not yet been extended to corporations indicates 
that the right to reputation subsumed within it should not be so extended, it cannot 
determine the question once and for all. The same argument was made with respect to the 
SURWHFWLRQRIµKRPH¶XQGHU$UW123 before the Court decided that it applied to corporate 
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business premises.124 ,QIDFW WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ EDV to proceed on the basis that 
corporate reputation falls within the scope of Art 8 implies that the µSULYDWHOLIH¶OLPERI
Art 8 can apply to companies. In the passage of its judgment in which the Court assumes 
WKDW µWKH UHSXWDWLRQRID FRPSDQ\ IDOOVXQGHU WKHQRWLRQRISULYDWH OLIH¶125 there is no 
suggestion that the µQRWLRQ RI SULYDWH OLIH¶ might itself be inapplicable to corporate 
applicants. In EDV there was also a complaint under Art 9 (freedom of thought, 
FRQVFLHQFHDQGUHOLJLRQZKLFKWKH&RXUWGHFODUHGLQDGPLVVLEOHDVEHLQJµLQFRPSDWLEOH
ratione personae ZLWKWKHSURYLVLRQVRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶126 because the applicant was µa 
OHJDOSHUVRQIRXQGHGH[FOXVLYHO\IRUEXVLQHVVSXUSRVHV¶.127 The fact that this reasoning 
ZDVHPSOR\HGLQUHODWLRQWRWKHDSSOLFDQW¶V$UWFODLPEXWQRWLWV$UWFODLPVXJJHVWV
WKDW LQ WKH &RXUW¶V YLHZ WKH corporate, for-profit nature of an applicant will not 
necessarily mean that it cannot claim a right WRUHVSHFWIRULWVµSULYDWHOLIH¶under Art 8. 
Theoretical coherence 
2VWHU¶VDUJXPHQWLVQRWVLPSO\WKDWWKH&RXUWKDVQRW\HWextended the protection of the 
µSULYDWHOLIH¶DUPRf Art 8 to corporate applicants. It is that, in principle, WKHµFRQFHSWRI
³SULYDWH OLIH´ LV intrinsicalO\ WLHG WR LQGLYLGXDOV¶ DQG LV therefore inapplicable to 
FRUSRUDWLRQV DQG WKDW WKH (&W+5¶V MXVWLILFDWLRQV for protecting individual reputation 
under Art 8 are similarly inapplicable to companies.128 
On the basis of the µORRNLQJ-JODVV VHOI¶ interpretation RI WKH (&W+5¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH, 
which links reputation to SULYDWHOLIHWKURXJKWKHFRQFHSWRIµSV\FKRORJLFDOLQWHJULW\¶,129 
0XOOLVDQG6FRWWVXJJHVWWKDWµQRQ-KXPDQOHJDOLQGLYLGXDOV«DUHDEOHWRUHO\RQ$UWLFOH
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 DUJXPHQWV RQO\¶ ZKHQ VHHNLQJ WR SURWHFW WKHLU UHSXWDWLRQV130 Similarly, the 
µVRFLDOLW\¶ MXVWLILFDWLRQ ZKHUHE\ UHSXWDWLRQ LV SURWHFWHG EHFDXVH RI LWV FRQWULEXWLRn to 
social relationships, is inapplicable to corporate reputation.131 These rationales for 
protecting reputation under Art 8 have also been supported by English courts,132 which 
may explain the tendency of those courts to regard Art 8 as inapplicable to corporate 
defamation claims.133 
Nor do corporations have dignitary interests of the kind highlighted by Judge Loucaides 
in Lindon.134 The Court recognised this in the Art 10 case Uj: 
«WKHUH LV D GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH FRPPHUFLDO UHSXWDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV RI D
company and the reputation of an individual concerning his or her social status. 
Whereas the latter might have repercussions RQ RQH¶V GLJQLW\ « interests of 
commercial reputation are devoid of that moral dimension.135 
7KH &RXUW¶V interpretation of Art 8 is influenced to some extent by the concept of 
µSHUVRQDOLW\ ULJKWV¶ deriving from Continental civil law traditions.136 This may be a 
further reason to doubt the applicability of Art 8 to corporate reputation, given that the 
personality rights to which corporations are entitled in these jurisdictions are less 
extensive than those available to natural persons.137 
Whichever of the (&W+5¶V vague justifications for protecting reputation under Art 8 is 
preferred, it is inapplicable to corporations on a conceptual level: companies have no 
                                                          
130
 Mullis and Scott (n 1) 45-46. See also Tomlinson (n 57).  
131
 Howarth (n 47) 874. 
132
 eg Re Guardian News and Media Ltd [2010] UKSC 1, [42]; Yeo (n 57) [144]-[145] 
133
 See text to notes 23-26. 
134
 See text to notes 75-78. 
135
 Uj (n 36) para 22. See also MTE (n 20) para 84; Kharlamov v Russia [2015] ECHR 860, para 29. 
136
 See eg Delfi AS v Estonia (2016) 62 EHRR 6, Concurring Opinion of Judge ZupanþLþ Thanks to the 
anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention. 
137
 Gert BrüJJHPHLHU $XUHOLD &RORPEL &LDFFKL DQG 3DWULFN 2¶&DOODJKDQ HGV Personality Rights in 
European Tort Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 575; Oster (n 43) 257-58. 
 26 
µSHUVRQDO LGHQWLW\¶ QR µSV\FKRORJLFDO LQWHJULW\¶ QR µUHODWLRQVKLSV ZLWK RWKHU KXPDQ
EHLQJV¶QRGLJQLW\DQGQRSHUVRQDODXWRQRP\138 As such, there is no good theoretical 
reason for the Court to extend the protection of reputation under Art 8 to corporate 
applicants.   
As noted above, the cases in which the Court has extended other Art 8 rights to companies 
have all LQYROYHGDVWDWH¶VEUHDFKRILWVQHJDWLYHREOLJDWLRQV139 ,QWKHVHFDVHVWKH&RXUW¶V
reasons for imposing obligations tend to focus on the importance of maintaining the rule 
of law and preventing the arbitrary use of government power: for example, Marius 
Emberland notes that rule of law arguments were µHVVHQWLDO¶ WRWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQWR
extend the Art 8 proWHFWLRQRI µKRPH¶ WR D FRUSRUDWH DSSOLFDQW in Société Colas Est v 
France.140 As such, the rationales EHKLQGWKH&RXUW¶VH[WHQVLRQWRFRUSRUDWLRQVRI$UW8 
rights other than reputation are also inapplicable to the interest in corporate reputation in 
the context of defamation law.141 
Unfortunately, in the cases in which the Court has entertained the possibility that 
corporate reputation might fall within the scope of Art 8, it has relied on similarly vague 
reasoning to that which it employed in its earliest cases on the protection of individual 
reputation. The Court has simply asserted WKDW WKH FRQFHSW RI µSULYDWH OLIH¶ LQ $UW 
µHQFRPSDVVHV¶UHSXWDWLRQ142 or that WKHULJKWWRUHSXWDWLRQLVµSDUWRIWKHULJKWWRUHVSHFW
for private lifH¶143 These assertions, when employed in those early cases, were deficient 
                                                          
138
 See eg Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Defamation Bill (2012-13, HL 84, HC 
810) para 55. 
139
 Text to note 113. 
140
 Emberland (n 8) 46. 6HHDOVR:LQIULHG+$0YDQGHQ0XLMVHQEHUJKDQG6DP5H]DLµ&RUSRUDWLRQVDQG
WKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶*OREDO%XVLQHVVDQG'Hvelopment Law Journal 
43, 56; van der Sloot (n 113) 30-32. 
141
 van der Sloot (n 113) 30. 
142
 EDV (n 14) para 21. 
143
 MTE (n 20) para 57. 
 27 
in explaining the link between reputation and private life. They remain so in the context 
of the interest in corporate reputation. 
Other arguments in favour of Article 8 protection 
Eileen Weinert, DOWKRXJKQRW LQVXSSRUWRI WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ LQ EDV, suggests that 
µUHVSHFWIRUWKHULJKWWRUHSXWDWLRQDSSHDUVWRKDYHFUHSWLQWRDUWWKURXJKWKHEDFNGRRU
and if that state of affairs is accepted, it is no great stretch to afford the protection to 
FRPSDQLHV ZKR DUH DIWHU DOO HQWLWOHG WR SURWHFW WKHLU JRRGZLOO¶144 Hugh Tomlinson, 
similarly, considers LWµSHUKDSVXQVXUSULVLQJ¶WKDWWKH&RXUWZRXOGILQGDFRUSRUDWHULJKW
to reputation to exist under Art 8, given its previous case law on corporate privacy 
rights.145 This may be correct.146 But whether such a finding would be surprising has no 
bearing on whether it would be legally or conceptually appropriate. 
The VHFRQGVWUDQGRI:HLQHUW¶VVWDWHPent ± WKDWFRPSDQLHVDUHµHQWLWOHGWRSURWHFWWKHLU
JRRGZLOO¶± VHHPVWRSUHVXPHWKDWDFRPSDQ\¶VLQWHUHVWLQLWVJRRGZLOOPLJKWVRPHKRZ
be relevant to Art 8. Oliver makes a similar argument: noting the protection of personal 
reputation under Art 8, he sugJHVWVWKDWµ/RJLFDOO\WKHVDPHVKRXOGDSSO\WREXVLQHVVHV
VLQFHLIWKHLUUHSXWDWLRQLVWDUQLVKHGWKH\FDQEHUXLQHG¶147 It is obviously plausible to 
argue that a business might be ruined by reputational harm, but that does not mean that 
this harm is relevant to the Art 8 right to private life. As Mullis and Scott argue:  
The dimension of reputation that is appropriately conceived as a property interest 
is not unimportant, but there must be real concerns over affording it protection 
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under Article 8 when it is inherently an extrinsic, perhaps a financial, form of 
harm.148  
2QHILQDODUJXPHQWDOVRSXWIRUZDUGE\7RPOLQVRQLVWKDWµ7KHH[WHQVLRQRIWKHULJKW
would mean that defamation cases brought by both companies and individuals could be 
considered within tKHVDPHDQDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRUN¶149 It is not clear why Tomlinson thinks 
WKLVZRXOGUHVXOWLQDQµLPSURYHPHQWLQDQDO\WLFDOFODULW\¶150 given that individual and 
corporate claimants are already subject to different rules in English defamation law. 
Tomlinson also suggests that the balancing exercise between Arts 8 and 10 would operate 
differently in cases involving corporate claimants, reflecting the different nature of their 
reputational interests.151 If taking those different characteristics into account at the 
balancing stage would not result in a lack of µanalytical clarity¶, then it is difficult to see 
why taking them into account at a previous stage ± when determining which, if any, 
Convention rights are engaged ± would be problematic. 
Summary 
I have argued in this section that there is no good justification in the ECtHR jurisprudence 
on the protection of individual reputation under Art 8 for the Court to extend that 
protection to corporations, and that it would be conceptually inappropriate for it to do so. 
In the next section, I consider the potential applicability of A1P1 to corporate reputation, 
as an alternative to Art 8. 
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Article 1, Protocol 1 
In addition to leaving open the applicability of Art 8 to corporate reputation, the ECtHR 
in EDV left open the applicability of A1P1,152 the right to property, which reads as 
follows: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
As legal persons are explicitly referred to as beneficiaries of A1P1 rights, the key question 
here LVZKHWKHU FRUSRUDWH UHSXWDWLRQ FDQEH FRQVLGHUHGD µSRVVHVVLRQ¶, thereby falling 
within the scope of A1P1. I argue in this section that corporate reputation is not a 
possession for this purpose, and should not be protected by A1P1.  
Goodwill 
7KHFRQFHSWRI µSRVVHVVLRQV¶ in A1P1 is not limited to physical things: µFHUWDLQRWKHU
ULJKWVDQGLQWHUHVWVFRQVWLWXWLQJDVVHWVFDQDOVREHUHJDUGHGDV³SURSHUW\ULJKWV´DQGWKXV
DV³SRVVHVVLRQV´¶153 Since corporate reputation is often described as an intangible asset 
in its own right,154 or DQHOHPHQWRIWKHLQWDQJLEOHDVVHWµJRRGZLOO¶155 there is at least a 
plausible argument that it might FRQVWLWXWHDµSRVVHVVLRQ¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRI$3 
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The Court has ruled in several cases that the goodwill of a professional practice,156 or of 
a µbusiness HQJDJHGLQFRPPHUFH¶,157 can be a possession. Oster suggests that the interest 
LQFRUSRUDWH UHSXWDWLRQ µQHDWO\ ILWV¶ZLWK WKese cases, and could therefore be protected 
under A1P1.158 Similarly, Alastair Mowbray argues that the case of Tre Traktörer v 
Sweden (in which the Court found that A1P1 was engaged by the withdrawal from a 
restaurant of its licence to serve alcohol, because RIWKHµDGYHUVHHIIHFWVRQWKHJRRGZLOO
DQGYDOXHRIWKHUHVWDXUDQW¶FDXVHGE\WKDWZLWKGUDZDO159) indicates that A1P1 can protect 
µQRn-material commercial interests such as the goodwill (ie the financial value of a 
FRPSDQ\¶VUHSXWDWLRQRIHVWDEOLVKHGEXVLQHVVHV¶160 However, I argue that this line of 
cases does not support the view that corporate reputation itself FRQVWLWXWHVDµSRVVHVVLRQ¶ 
In the first case on the protection of goodwill under A1P1, Van Marle v The Netherlands, 
the applicants complained of a state action that they alleged had caused a diminution in 
µWKHYDOXHRIWKHJRRGZLOORIWKHLUDFFRXQWDQF\SUDFWLFHV¶161 TKH&RXUWKHOGWKDWWKHµULJKW
WRJRRGZLOO¶FODLPHGE\WKHDSSOLFDQWVµPD\EHOLNHQHGWRWKHULJKWRISURSHUW\¶ in A1P1, 
EHFDXVHµE\GLQWRIWKHLURZQZRUNWKHDSSOLFDQWVKDGEXLOWXSDFOLHQWHOHWKLVKDGLQ
many respects the nature of a private right and constituted an asset and, hence, a 
possHVVLRQ¶.162 ,WLVXQIRUWXQDWHWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVoning here is so opaque. This has not 
been helped by its subsequent decisions: for example, in Wendenburg v Germany, the 
&RXUW¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI WKHDSSOLFDQWV¶ODZSUDFWLFHV, and the clientele of those practices, 
DVµHQWLWLHVRIDFHUWDLQZRUWKWKDWKDYHLQPDQ\UHVSHFWVWKHQDWXUHRIDSULYDWHULJKWDQG
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WKXV FRQVWLWXWH DVVHWV DQG WKHUHIRUH SRVVHVVLRQV¶163 is so unclear as to be almost 
meaningless. 
TKH&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH LGHQWLI\LQJ JRRGZLOO DV DSRVVHVVLRQ also seems to conflict 
with a related line of cases in which it has held that a loss of future income will not engage 
A1P1EHFDXVHWKDW$UWLFOHµGRHVQRW«JXDUDQWHHWKHULJKWWRDFTXLUHSURSHUW\¶164 For 
example, in Ian Edgar (Liverpool) Ltd v UKWKH&RXUWUXOHGWKDWWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VFODLPWR
SURSHUW\LQJRRGZLOOµEDVHGXSRQWKHSURILWVJHQHUDWHGE\WKHEXVLQHVV¶ZDVLQVXEVWDQFH
a complaint of a µORVVRIIXWXUHLQFRPH¶DQGWKHUHIRUH fell outside the scope of A1P1.165 
This apparent conflict has caused problems for English courts attempting to interpret this 
strDQGRIWKH(&W+5¶VFDVHODZ.166 
Marketability 
The interpretation that has been preferred by the English courts is that goodwill only 
constitutes a possession in its own right if it is capable of being sold by the applicant.167 
The issue arose in the Court of Appeal in R (Malik) v Waltham Forest NHS Primary Care 
Trust,168 which involved the suspension of the claimant doctor from a list of persons 
entitled to perform services for the NHS, and the resulting loss of goodwill, including 
reputation, alleged to have been suffered by WKHFODLPDQW¶VSUDFWLFH. The claimant was 
precluded by law from selling the goodwill in his practice.169 
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Auld LJ endorsed the µmarketability¶ standard for determining whether goodwill 
constitutes a possession under A1P1.170 Under this approach, corporate reputation should 
not be considered a possession. As Moses LJ observed, the reputation element of 
goodwill, although it may be of significant value, is not marketable.171 A company cannot 
sell its reputation, because the reputation cannot be separated from the company itself.172  
Future income 
The argument that marketability is required for goodwill to fall within the scope of A1P1 
was doubted by Rix LJ, partly on the basis that the ECtHR jurisprudence focuses on the 
µJRRGZLOO«of professionals with respect to their clientele «>DQG@ such goodwill is not 
readily PDUNHWDEOH¶173  
However, it is not necessary to accept the marketability interpretation to reach the 
conclusion that WKHILQDQFLDOYDOXHRIDFRPSDQ\¶VUHSXWDWLRQOLHVLQLWVHIIHFWRQIXWXUH
earnings,174 and therefore that it should not be considered a µSRVVHVVLRQ¶ under A1P1. In 
Moses LJ¶VMXGJPHQW, the lack of A1P1 protection for future income precluded reputation 
IURPIDOOLQJZLWKLQWKHDUWLFOH¶VVFRSH  
[Reputation] has no economic value other than being that which a professional 
man may exploit in order to earn or increase his earnings for the future. If the 
principle that the ability to earn future income is not a possession within [A1P1] 
is to be maintained, it must follow that if the element of goodwill which has [been] 
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or may be damaged is reputation, or the loyalty of past clients, that element is not 
to be identified as a possession.175  
5HJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHUWKH(&W+5MXULVSUXGHQFHHVWDEOLVKHVDµPDUNHWDELOLW\¶VWDQGDUGIRU
the protection of goodwill as a possession, then, the reputation coPSRQHQWRIDFRPSDQ\¶V
goodwill will not, in its own right, fall within the scope of A1P1, because its financial 
YDOXHLVVROHO\DWWULEXWDEOHWRLWVHIIHFWRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VIXWXUHILQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFH
DQGH[SHFWDWLRQVRIIXWXUHLQFRPHDUHQRWµSRVVHVVLRQV¶176 Even where a company can 
demonstrate that a reputational injury has caused a fall in revenue, A1P1 will not be 
engaged because there is no interference with an existing possession: as put by Baroness 
+DOHWKHUHLVµQR&RQYHQWLRQULJKWWRFRQWLQXHWRHQMR\DSDUWLFXODUOHYHORIWUDGH¶177 
Ownership 
Even if the preceding argument fails, and a company¶V UHSXWDWLRQ does constitute an 
element of its goodwill that has an identifiable current value distinct from its contribution 
WRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VIXWXUHLQFRPH, there is a further reason that it should not be protected 
under A1P1. On one interpretation of its goodwill jurisprudence, the ECtHR has not been 
protecting goodwill per se as a possession, but the contribution it makes to the value of a 
distinct asset. If this interpretation is correct, it is doubtful whether a company could be 
FRQVLGHUHG WR µRZQ¶ any relevant possession that might be affected by a reputational 
injury. 
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TKH &RXUW¶V WUHDWPHQt of goodwill as a possession developed in cases brought by 
individual applicants in respect of a loss of goodwill in their professional practices.178 In 
subsequent decisions, the Court has described this line of cases as establishing that 
µJRRGZLOOPD\EHan element in the valuation of DSURIHVVLRQDOSUDFWLFH¶179 The Court has 
sometimes referred to the goodwill of businesses in cases involving the withdrawal of, or 
refusal to grant, licences;180 but in Malik it stated that in these cases LW µKDV WHQGHG WR
regaUGDVD³SRVVHVVLRQ´the underlying business or professional practice LQTXHVWLRQ¶181 
In other words, ZKHQLGHQWLI\LQJµJRRGZLOO¶DVDSRVVHVVLRQWKH&RXUWKDVLQIDFWEHHQ
protecting the contribution made by that goodwill to the value of a distinct asset ± a 
business or professional practice ± owned by the applicant. Where goodwill in that sense 
is injured, the result is a fall in the value of the relevant asset, which can sensibly be 
GHVFULEHGDVDQLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VSURSHUW\LQWKDWDVVHW. 
In contrast, whenever a corporate applicant has complained of a loss of its own goodwill, 
the Court has rejected its application on the basis that it amounted to a complaint of loss 
of future income.182 The reputation of a company attaches to the company itself; any value 
WKDWLWKDVFRQWULEXWHVWRWKHYDOXHRIWKHFRPSDQ\QRWWRDQ\RIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDVVHWV$V
such, DIDOOLQWKHYDOXHRIDFRPSDQ\¶VUHSXWDWLRQXOWLPDWHO\PDQLIHVWVLWVHOIDV a fall in 
the value of the company itself. This cannot represent a diminution of the value of an asset 
owned by the company, because the company cannot own itself.183 The proper claimants 
in respect of a fall in the value of a company would be its shareholders or owners.184 Since 
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a claim in libel can only properly be brought to protect the reputation of the claimant, not 
RI WKH FODLPDQW¶V DVVHWV185 on this interpretation of the Strasbourg jurisprudence the 
corporate interest in reputation protected in defamation law cannot constitute a possession 
under A1P1. 
Other arguments 
Oster argues that corporate reputation is, or ought to be, encompassed by A1P1.186 One 
strand of his argument is based on Robert Post¶V theory identifying three conceptions of 
reputation that have influenced the development of defamation law: reputation as 
property, honour, and dignity.187 Noting that companies can make no sensible claim to 
3RVW¶VFRQFHSWLRQVRIUHSXWDWLRQDVKRQRXURUGLJQLW\Oster argues that µLWLVDGLVWLQFWLYH
IHDWXUHRIDFRPSDQ\¶VVXLWIRUGHIDPDWLRQWKDWLWPD\exclusively be explained by the 
FRQFHSWLRQRIUHSXWDWLRQDVSURSHUW\¶188  
But the observation that a corporation has no claim to dignity or honour only leads to the 
conclusion that its reputation can exclusively be conceptualised as property if one accepts 
3RVW¶VWKUHHFRQFHSWLRQVDVFRKHUHQWDQGH[KDXVWLYH Post himself did not claim that his 
conceptions were exhaustive.189 Further, there are good reasons to reject the 
characterisation of corporate reputation as in itself a form of property. For example, it is 
not alienable separately from the company to which it attaches, and alienability is seen 
by some as a core characteristic of property.190 The fact that a good reputation has 
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pecuniary value to a company does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it should 
be characterised as a form of property.191  
In (QJOLVKODZDOWKRXJKDFRPSDQ\¶VJRRGZLOOLV in some circumstances its property, not 
DOO DVSHFWV RI D FRPSDQ\¶V UHSXWation count as goodwill.192 For example, goodwill is 
treated as a property interest in the tort of passing off, but µPHUHUHSXWDWLRQ« does not 
E\LWVHOIFRQVWLWXWH«SURSHUW\¶ in the context of that tort.193 
More importantly, the characterisation of corporate reputation as property, whether in 
theory or in domestic law, is not determinative of whether it is a µpossession¶ under A1P1. 
TKHFRQFHSWRIµSRVVHVVLRQV¶WKDWGLFWDWHVWKHVFRSHRIA1P1 protection is autonomous, 
and does not necessarily reflect the position in domestic law.194 Van Marle itself is a good 
example: the ECtHR in that case was unswayed by the statH¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWLQ'XWFK law 
µthere was no sucKWKLQJDVD³ULJKWWRJRRGZLOO´ ZKLFKFRXOGEHUHJDUGHGDVSURSHUW\¶195 
There would be even less reason for the Court, if asked to decide whether corporate 
reputation is a possession under $3WREDVHLWVGHFLVLRQRQWKHLQWHUHVW¶VILWZLWKWKH
conceptions of reputation described by Robert Post.  
It might also be pointed out that, in common with corporate Art 8 rights, to date the Court 
has only protected goodwill under A1P1 in cases where the interference in question 
resulted directly from state action.196 If a right to corporate reputation is found to exist 
under A1P1, then it will only affect English defamation law if it gives rise to positive 
obligations. As argued with respect to Art 8, this may make it less likely that the ECtHR 
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will find a corporate right to reputation to exist in the context of a defamation dispute, but 
it is probably not a barrier to the existence of the right.197  
Summary 
$3GRHVQRWSURWHFWFRUSRUDWHUHSXWDWLRQ7KLVLVHLWKHUEHFDXVHDFRPSDQ\¶VUHSXWDWLRQ
LVQRWµPDUNHWDEOH¶EHFDXVH its financial value lies in its effect on future earnings, which 
are unprotected by A1P1; or because it makes no contribution to the value of a distinct 
DVVHWRZQHGE\WKHFRPSDQ\7KHFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIUHSXWDWLRQDVµSURSHUW\¶HLWKHU in 
theory or domestic law, should not override these arguments.  
Conclusion: cause for concern 
,KDYHDUJXHGWKDWWKHUHLVQRJRRGMXVWLILFDWLRQZKHWKHULQWKH(&W+5¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHRU
in theory, for the existence of a Convention right to corporate reputation. Nevertheless, 
the EDV decision indicates that the Court is willing to entertain the possibility that it will 
find such a right to exist in the future. The apparent ease with which the Court has 
assumed that corporate reputation might fall within the scope of Art 8 or A1P1 should be 
concerning. The discovery of a Convention right to corporate reputation could have 
important consequences for English corporate defamation law, both in terms of its current 
application and in its effect on future reform efforts.198  
If found to exist under Art 8 specifically, a right to corporate reputation could even make 
English defamation law incompatible with the Convention, because of the Defamation 
Act 2013, sub-s 1(2), which requires for-SURILW FRUSRUDWH FODLPDQWV WR VKRZ µVHULRXV
ILQDQFLDOORVV¶RUDOLkelihood thereof, to succeed in a defamation action. The ECtHR has 
ruled that reputational harm will only engage Art 8 subject to a threshold of seriousness, 
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and this threshold would also apply to corporate applicants.199 But the threshold adopted 
E\WKH(&W+5UHODWHVWRWKHVHULRXVQHVVRIWKHµDWWDFN¶RQUHSXWDWLRQZKHUHDVWKHVXE-s 
1(2) threshold relates to the existence or probability of financial consequences of a 
reputational injury. It is difficult to see the ECtHR, treatLQJDFRPSDQ\¶VUHSXWDWLRQDV
µSDUWRI¶LWVULJKWWRSULYDWHOLIHUHTXLULQJ it to show a distinct category of consequential 
loss for an attack on its reputation to engage Art 8.  
Further, and to my mind more importantly, there is a strong interest in the (&W+5¶V
interpretation of Convention rights being conceptually coherent, both to protect the 
&RXUW¶VOHJLWLPDF\DQGDELOLW\WRLQIOXHQFHGRPHVWLFULJKWVSURWHFWLRQ200 and as a matter 
of principle. As such, a Convention right to reputation should not be extended to 
corporations unless there is a strong justification for doing so.  
But, despite the arguments against a Convention right to corporate reputation made above, 
it is not implausible to think that the Court might find such a right to exist: it has form in 
extending Convention rights to corporate applicants without sufficiently considering 
whether doing so would be conceptually appropriate.201 
Two cases in particular illustrate this problem: Comingersoll SA v Portugal202 and Société 
Colas Est v France.203 In the former, the Court decided that a corporation was entitled to 
non-SHFXQLDU\ FRPSHQVDWLRQ XQGHU $UW  WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW µWKH FRPSDQ\¶V
reputation, uncertainty in decision-planning, disruption in the management of the 
FRPSDQ\ « [and] the anxiety and inconvenience caused to the members of the 
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PDQDJHPHQWWHDP¶204 In the latter, the Court held that the wRUGµKRPH¶LQ$UWLQFOXGHG
DFRPSDQ\¶V business premises.205 As GLVFXVVHGDERYHWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJLQERWKRI
these cases was influenced by concerns relating to the rule of law.206 Emberland suggests 
that, when the Court relies on this kind RIDUJXPHQWLWµSD\VVFDQWLIDQ\DWWHQWLRQWR
what form of person RUZKDWNLQGVRILQWHUHVWV« would benefit¶.207 
Rule of law arguments are unlikely to be important in a typical corporate defamation 
claim. But in both Colas and Comingersoll the Court also relied on WKH µG\QDPLF
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶FRQFHSW:KLOHWKH&RXUW¶VXVHRIWKHµG\QDPLF¶RUµHYROXWLYH¶PHWKRGRI
interpretation is usually based on its assessment of the changing conditions in which it is 
required to apply the Convention, or the developing consensus among member states as 
to the appropriate minimum standards for human rights protection,208 its use in 
Comingersoll and Colas was based instead on the µgradual and case-by-case extension of 
WKH&RQYHQWLRQ
VVFRSHDVDIRUPRI³VQRZEDOOHIIHFW´¶209 Emberland has characterised 
WKLVPHWKRGRIUHDVRQLQJDVUHO\LQJRQWKH&RXUW¶VµEHOLHILQWKHLQHYLWDEOHH[SDQVLRQRI
WKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶DQGQRWHGWKDWWKLVEHOLHIµKDVWKHFDSDFLW\«Wo prevail over profound 
disagreement within the Court as to the nature and purpose RI(&+5SURWHFWLRQ¶210  
Although expanding the scope of Convention protection is not necessarily problematic, it 
is more likely to be where the beneficiaries are corporations rather than human beings.211 
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The different characteristics of human and legal persons should encourage caution in 
extending to the latter fundamental rights designed with the former in mind. The ease 
with which the Court has abandoned this caution in the past should raise concerns 
regarding the likelihood that it will properly take into account the nature of corporate 
reputation if it is asked to decide whether that interest falls within the scope of a 
Convention right in the future. 
